Last taboo
You will find below the first post by Simon Kitchen, a new occasional contributor to arabist.net. Simon comes from an economic and risk analysis background, a perspective that I am sure will enrich the debate. [issandr]
In all the current discussion of political reform in the Middle East, and a possible dynastic succession in Egypt, the role of the military goes all but unremarked. Yet the Egypt military establishment continues to play a vital economic (perhaps a third of GDP is under military supervision or influence) and political role, and arguably has a veto over political reform and the succession of Gamal Mubarak as the next president of Egypt.
Discussions over the candidacy of Saad ed-din Ibrahim and Nawal al-Saadawi, and possibility of more open elections in Egypt in 2004 are interesting, but they also function as a smokescreen, occupying the press and civil society while real power lies outside the NDP and the cabinet. During June 2004, Egypt was nominally governed by Prime Minister Atef Ebeid for nearly three weeks while President Mubarak recovered from surgery in Germany. But Ebeid was a lame duck, his pending resignation having been announced the week before. So who was in charge? The answer, in all likelihood, was Mubarak’s lieutenants in the military and intelligence establishment.
Rami Khouri of the Daily Star raises the problem of the military’s role in Middle Eastern politics in an op-ed in the Daily Star. He mentions a recent report from the Brookings Institution, a centrist (at least by US standards) think tank, that examines the military establishments of Egypt, Pakistan and Syria, and their roles in influencing politics from behind the scenes. The report describes the ubiquitous of former and serving military and intelligence personnel at many levels of civilian life, and argues that civilian control over the military must be reestablished.
The lewa (general) is an over-familiar sight in the Egyptian popular imagination: generals serve as the governors of Egyptian provinces, are in charge of gathering statistics, and are invoked in legal disputes as sources of wasta (political influence). Their sons are among Egypt’s most influential businessmen, something they have in common with their peers in Syria and Algeria.
Algeria, oddly, is absent from the Brookings Institution’s report, even though the Algerian military establishment, the pouvoir, has also laid its deadening hand on political and economic reform. (Also absent, perhaps more understandably, is Israel, which has generally separated civilian and military authority. However, the lines seem to be blurring in Israel, with Shaul Mofaz quickly moving from Chief of Staff to Defence Minister in 2002. Moreover, current Prime Minister Ariel Sharon considered a less democratic route to power, a military coup, in 1967.)
Western governments regard the military in Egypt – as in Algeria and Turkey - as a safe pair of hands, a bulwark against potentially disruptive Islamist and popular movements. The US state department sees the relationship with the Egyptian military as the cornerstone of the US-Egypt relationship; the Egyptian military sees the US as its most important ally. But the military is deeply conservative, and its attitudes are detrimental to Egypt’s political development: it’s ‘no beards’ rule has barred the Muslim Brotherhood from reasonable political participation since the 1970s, and has given the Brotherhood the easy legitimacy of an illegal opposition group.
The Egyptian military plays its cards close to its chest, and it is difficult to gauge this corporate group’s attitudes to contemporary issues such as reform and the succession. I have heard that the military is now more positive about Gamal Mubarak’s succession than it was 18 months ago, having been persuaded that Gamal has intelligent associates and that his succession will be accepted by Washington. But the Brookings report is not the first to have mentioned Omar Suleiman, director of General Intelligence, as an alternative successor. Even if Gamal does succeed, he will likely be closely supervised by his father’s military peers and associates.
Categories: Egypt, Military.
Good to have you on-board Simon. Look forward to lots of posts and exchanges.
I think you raise some good points…..I don’t have an answer as to who was governing Egypt last Summer when Mubarak was in Germany. I don’t necessary think that we should assume it was the military just because Obeid was a lame duck. As far as I could tell Obeid was a lame duck PM throughout his tenure.
Sadat proved capable of depoliticizing and dividing up the military and Mubarak has continued the trend. The fact is the military may not be the strong unified organ we think about. Egypt is not Turkey after all.
Why? Even in 1988 when Mubarak dismissed Abd al-Hamid Abu Ghazala - he did so without much opposition the military brass. At the time, Abu Ghazala was much more popular than Mubarak was. It is arguable that Mubarak had fully consolidated his rule at that point. So the fact a weaker executive could remove the army’s man with such ease speaks volumes about institutions (incl. the military). I have seen nothing to suggest that the military can structurally assert itself against the president here.
I don’t think the military has a collective position on the succession issue because they have been encouraged, trained, and led into a realm where they are not premitted political opinions.
Just as I agree the regime is playing up the Saad and Nawal candidacies, I also believe the military has been hyped up beyond its capabilities. For the past year, I have felt the military (and or Omar Suliyman depending on how we classify the mukhaberat) factor was a red herring.
I am probably underestimating the military but I’ve seen nothing to indicate autonomy (most favored status in society for me does not indicate influence - if anything it describes the opposite which is dependency on the benefactor).
Some high ranking powerful military generals will definitely be in the room when Egypt’s next president is decided but I disagree about their power play influence.
I expect to see increased populism used with the military - i.e. they will have their benefits maintained and extended to premit Gamal (as far as I can see 2004-2005 has been the year of Gamal populism so I think it is likely to be done with the military as well).
Good post though….it should gets of attention — for better and worse.
Looking forward to some more insight from you, Simon. This place is getting better by the day. Great job, Issandr.
Although I would hesitate to add that historically, the military has always been somehow invovled in all political changes that have ever occured in Egypt, I’d also have to second Josh that - in its current guise - there is little political room for the army to impose its own opinions, if it were to have any as a unified unit.
I am certain that there could never be any form of civil movement simply because it would have to garner the explicit support - or silence of - the military beforehand: the Egyptian army plays a simple game of numbers, and the level, scope and breadth of training and the organisation’s independence from the state make it a state within a state of sorts. Simply put, any movement would have to confront not only state forces, but an army that can outnumber and practically outlive everything else. This makes the army a strong deterrent to loose and violent quasi-parties that are out to put themselves in power and plan to rely on bribery and mock politics to create support for their causes (e.g. some violent Islamic groups).
If Gamal does take the next term, I believe the army’s role will remain as it was through Mubarak’s years.
I think that the military is probably interested in one or two major political issues, and are content to stay away from day-to-day rule as long as they are left alone to pursue their own interests. In this sense, the executive is independent of the military.
The issues that the military establishment feels are important are the relationship with the US, the treaty with Israel (essentially the same thing), the presidential succession, ‘national unity’ i.e. no sectarian conflict, and keeping the Islamists out of power. I think that the most senior ranks of the military share assumptions and preferences on this. I don’t think they care very much about economics, or even social policy, because the interests of members of the military may diverge on these.
A lot of this is supposition, or based on hearsay: however, I think a lot of the initial objections to Gamal were based on his lack of military experience/understanding. Might he drag us into a war with Israel? Might he be too lenient on Islamists? etc.
The Brookings report makes the nice point that the regime appears not to be too closely influenced by the military precisely because the military trusts the executive.
However, the appearance could also be, as Josh says, because the military doesn’t really have much interest in politics.
It’s an interesting subject. Personally, I do wonder whether the fact that Gamal is a proxy for Egyptian discontent with Hosni is likely to stymie his chances, however. Suleiman seems a much more likely contender for the presidency because not only does he have the military background, but he has an immense amount of clout internationally - he’s one of the few Arabs the Israelis take seriously, Westerners seem to like working with him, and he has quite a bit of leverage with fellow Arab states - a week or two ago he was off successfully defusing a nasty spat between Saudi and Libya.
What about Gamal for the Prime Ministership? It would seem to be a useful way for Hosni to ‘keep’ his word about hereditary succession while ensuring continuity…
Matt
And lose Nazif? If there ever was a business lobby in Egypt, then would be the time they’d make themselves heard. No, Nazif has caused too many favorable ripples to be gotten rid of this quick.
the coup link is not working. can you post the article?
The ‘coup’ link has been corrected in the post. I am also posting the full story below for future reference.
Sharon considered 1967 coup to force war with Egypt
By Inigo Gilmore in Tel Aviv
(Filed: 17/11/2004)
Ariel Sharon considered a military coup to force a war against Egypt in 1967, the Israeli prime minister confessed in a government publication released yesterday.
The revelation was contained in Ma’arachot, published by the defence ministry, and Mr Sharon’s admission may lead to a re-examination of the build up to the 1967 war, which ended in the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The study shows that the general staff, which included the then Maj Gen Sharon and Yitzhak Rabin, then chief of staff and later prime minister, was convinced that the country was in danger because the government was prevaricating over the launch of war. This caused Mr Sharon to consider locking up the cabinet.
Mr Sharon admitted that he suggested to Mr Rabin that they could hold the cabinet in a room until “the chief of staff goes to Israel Radio and makes an announcement”.
According to Mr Sharon’s account: “We often asked whether in the State of Israel there could arise a situation in which the army takes control.
“And I always said it was impossible, that this couldn’t happen in the State of Israel.
“And then, after the meeting [with Levi Eshkol, the prime minister] on May 28, I said to the chief of staff and others who were present, that there had arisen a situation in which this could happen, and that it would also be well accepted - that is to say, to seize control not in the framework of wanting to govern, but in the framework of making a decision, the fundamental decision, and that [the] army can make it without the government.
“I don’t remember if he agreed or not, but I think he also viewed it in this way.”
Mr Sharon believes the government might have acceded, adding: “They would have accepted it with a sense of relief. That was my feeling.”
The army has long been known to have put pressure on the government to declare what became the Six Day War but it was not previously known that Mr Sharon went so far as to contemplate a coup.
Stressing that no firm plot was drawn up, he confirmed that Yitzhak Rabin did not rule out the option after he discussed it with him.
In what historians have called the “generals’ revolt”, Mr Sharon and others demanded Levi Eshkol declare war against Egypt.
In his recently published book on the Six Day War, Jeremy Bowen, a BBC journalist, quotes Mr Sharon as telling Mr Eshkol that the Egyptians were ill prepared, and that “hesitation and delay” was eroding Israel’s best deterrent, which was “the Arabs’ fear of us”.
The military maintained that Israel must strike first, and regarded the build up of Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai peninsula and in the Red Sea as a casus belli.
Mr Eshkol initially refused, holding out for international assistance that never arrived but finally he relented and ordered an attack on June 5.
French authorities were urged yesterday to correct Yasser Arafat’s death certificate, which wrongly states his place of birth as Jerusalem and not Cairo.
The details were copied from Mr Arafat’s “livret de famille”, an official booklet issued to French families containing dates of birth, marriage and death. But, despite his lifelong claims, his birth certificate says he was born in Egypt.
back to the issue of the military in egypt. I do agree with the nalysis made by simon. I think the role of the military is underestimated, one tends to forget that the military is in power in egypt. Mubarak is a military man, so the army feels at ease with him. also the mechanism of passing power to the strongest general is somehow more democratic than passing pooffice to ones son. since in principal the army is a much more open system than a family is, and climbing the ladder there might contain many merit linked achievements. by ironically, I dop hope that Gamal will be the next president since I think that this will anger the military and creat a rift between the army and the executive and this will weaken the regime forcing gamal to open up to civil society in order to strengthen his base. Another strong general in power will eman statusquo, and honestly I am sick of it.
Dear sir
My name is Hani khairy el–Sayed Bouchra hanna
I occupy a position of assistant lecturer of Anesthesia at the faculty of medicine university of Alexandria Egypt in order for me to finish my doctoral thesis I went to uSA in san Francisco and did research on stem cells this is on my own expenses because the university didn’t give me the appropriate funds, I have finished all the steps for the medical licensure in the USA and I was offered a pediatric anesthesia fellowship at the university of new Mexico in Albuquerque yet the situation at the department of anesthesia here in Egypt they denied me both my doctoral thesis and today 10-3-05 they denied my right to travel to the USA for no apparent reason I am attaching the documents and I am trusting the integrity of the Egyptian government to disclose the biased policy of our universities despite the fact that my colleague a cardiothoracic surgeon was granted the same approval to get his fellowship at the Mayo clinic at Minnesota I am fed up with the policy of higher education here and all we get from our professors is the suffering they are pushing me to resign should I do it ? why they let us hate our beloved Egypt all my life I was here all my family and friends are here why don’t they give us the chance to learn abroad and return to increase the scientific background of our knowledge as you always encouraged in your speech why this discrimination I will not cost them a penny this fellowship is sponsored by USA why is USA more loving and tender than our native country they will not grant me here the doctoral thesis nor they will let me train and learn abroad please look into my dilemma so that everybody here in Egypt knows why our universities lead us the young generation of physicians into depression and despair, I am attaching all my documents and feel free to call me and I will provide you with all the documents just I need some support even a moral one cause I am so desperate and this is so unjust and humiliating situation to me I will provide with all my documents just contact me
Bless you all and trusting your sympathy
hboshra76@yahoo.com
33 Ibrahim Helmy Street
Roushdi
Alexandria
Egypt
Phone: 5449732
Mob: 0102861319
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