“Harakat at-Tajdid wal-Islah — Monotheism and Reform — better known by its French acronym MUR”

Wouldn’t Tajdid be “renewal” with tawhid being monotheism?

5. Khellihenna is a member of Thalat, a subtribe of the Reguibat Es Sahel (western) confederation, which POLISARIO’s first leader El Ouali also belonged to. Abdelaziz is from the Fokra subtribe, which is part of the Reguibat Ech Charg (eastern) confederation. As for Izerguiyine, there are certainly some pro-Morocco Izerguiyine, but also many in POLISARIO. For example, I believe their top negotiator at Manhasset, Mahfoud Ali Beiba, is a member of that tribe. So even if tribal affiliations matter, there are tons of gray zones, ambiguities and exceptions.

I would argue that the most significant tribal factor is that the Moroccan government has consistently encouraged tribalism (both as a political fact and as a prism to view the conflict through), and Polisario has constantly suppressed it (on the ideological level, but in political practice they’ve often exploited it too). The Moroccan government wants Sahrawi ranks divided and linked vertically through chieftaincies and co-opted elites to the throne (thus appointments, no elections, to CORCAS), while Polisario wants the opposite in the form of a “popular” Sahrawiness defined in contrast to the Moroccan, Algerian and Mauritanian nationalities. It would seem reality is a bit too complex for either party to be entirely comfortable with.

6. Well, even if the great majority of Moroccans want the Sahara, strategies must naturally differ. I would assume that if debate on the subject was allowed, it would quickly become an election issue. Especially in the Sahara, where the policy choices are important not just for nationalist & budgetary reasons. But as you said: royal domain.

5. Khellihenna is a member of Thalat, a subtribe of the Reguibat Es Sahel (western) confederation, which POLISARIO’s first leader El Ouali also belonged to. Abdelaziz is from the Fokra subtribe, which is part of the Reguibat Ech Charg (eastern) confederation. As for Izerguiyine, there are certainly some pro-Morocco Izerguiyine, but also many in POLISARIO. For example, I think their top negotiator at Manhasset, Mahfoud Ali Beiba, is a member of that tribe. So even if tribal affiliations matter, there are tons of gray zones, ambiguities and exceptions.

I would argue that the most significant tribal factor is that the Moroccan government has consistently encouraged tribalism (both as a political fact and as a prism to view the conflict through), and Polisario has constantly suppressed it (on the ideological level, but in political practice they’ve often exploited it too). The Moroccan government wants Sahrawi ranks divided and linked vertically through chieftaincies and co-opted elites to the throne (thus appointments, no elections, to CORCAS), while Polisario wants the opposite in the form of a “popular” Sahrawiness defined in contrast to the Moroccan, Algerian and Mauritanian nationalities. It would seem reality is a bit too complex for either party to be entirely comfortable with.

6. Well, even if the great majority of Moroccans want the Sahara, strategies must naturally differ. I would assume that if debate on the subject was allowed, it would quickly become an election issue. Especially in the Sahara, where the policy choices are important not just for nationalist & budgetary reasons. But as you said: royal domain.

A few comments en vrac:
1- The fraud taking place during the campaign was probably massive in terms of vote-buying, and probably (?) marginal in terms of stuffing the ballot boxes, although the report from the national (Moroccan) election observation team is much more gloomy than the one issued by the international observers (see http://www.blog.ma/obiterdicta/index.php?action=article&id_article=15346 ).

2- About Israel contra Morocco - Israel is one of the few countries to use proportional representation (PR) on the basis of a single, national constituency. This makes politics truly national. Morocco has on the cotnrary opted for very small constituencies (2 to 4 seats each), which contrary to custom in countries where RP is used do not fit pre-existing administrative units - the wilaya (region) would have been a more fitting unit in Morocco. the objective is of course to entrench the role of local notabilities, and probably also to allow for vote-buying to take place.

3 - As for the Istiqlal being Fassi and the MP being Berber, it should be nuanced, as both parties make a strong showing in areas outside their natural electoral core - see http://www.aqoul.com/archives/2007/09/the_moroccan_el.php .

4- It will be very interesting to see what happens within the PJD. The popular Mustapha Ramid/Ahmed Raïssouni wing, which has fared badly at he hands of the moderate and bourgeois Othmani/Daoudi/Benkirane wing, should normally have more of a say, and lead the party away from its Erdoganisation and towards a clearer, more populist opposition to the government and, more importantly, to the Royal supremacy which Ramid opposes in terms reminescent of those of the PSU, the PADS or the independent press, but not quite as radical as those of Al adl wal ihsan.

5 - On the Saharan provinces, things are indeed complciated when it comes to tribal affiliation. Mohamed Abdelaziz, a.k.a Abdelaziz el Marrakchi, Polisario’s leader, is a Rguibat as well as arch-loyalist CORCAS leader Khalil Henna Ould Rachid. But from what I understand they are not part of the same fractions. Elections in Laayoune pitted the Istiqlal candidate, a brother of Ould Rachid’s, against local strongman Hassan Derham, of the Aït Ba Amrane tribe, who allied himself with the Izergiyine tribe.

6- I would agree with Issandr that Sahara is a non-issue. The only political party sympathising with the separatist cause is Nahj dimoqrati, die-hard leftovers from Abraham Serfaty’s Ilal amam. As the issue is furthermore part of the royal domain…

By the way, you might be interested to know that as far as I can see the Western Sahara is a non-issue electorally, not exactly surprising since everyone lets the palace handle that file. Without entering into a debate onto this issue, while I support the idea of real autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty I’d like to see people be more critical of the official proposal, notably the human rights abuses that continue to take place. It’s not exactly inviting to the people Morocco is offering enlarged autonomy for. Unfortunately for many Moroccans the Sahara is either a knee-jerk emotional issue (those dastardly Algerians!) or, more often, a tiresome subject and a source of indignation (because it costs the country so much).

That they are, from Khellihenna Ould Errachid (CORCAS) & his brother, to Omar Hadrami (ex-Polisario) and all of those Joumani characters. But that’s essentially because the tribe isn’t pro-Moroccan — since it’s so large & leading, they can’t afford not to court it. Which is, I guess, a sensible strategy, as far as tribal meddling goes.

On the NDI thing, that is my understanding too — I don’t think they went much south of Marrakech. The EU may have, though.

Hope so. Anyone should realize it’s a potential trouble area, regardless of positions on the conflict. And well, I haven’t read their evaluation of the election, don’t know if it’s online — but if the EU’s public statements are any clue, they were very happy with what they saw.

But now: so how did you vote?

On the status of the Rguibat tribe I defer to you, I’m not on solid ground. My understanding is that individuals from it are currently the Makhzen-backed local politicos.

On the NDI thing, that is my understanding too — I don’t think they went much south of Marrakech. The EU may have, though.

On Western Sahara, a couple of comments:

1. To call the Reguibat pro-Moroccan I don’t think is accurate. For example, Polisario is to a large extent dominated and made-up of Reguibat (and some of their opponents argue that it is simply a political vehicle for Reguibat hegemony). This is partly because the Reguibat is the largest of the Sahrawi tribes (by very far, ~50% of the original pre-75 population), but they are also said to dominate the movement beyond their numerical weight. What Morocco is doing is to strategically favor certain influential sub-fractions, to entrench the Reguibat supporters they already hold (like the Joumanis) and draw Polisario leaders over to their side. With some success, too, although hardly on the level claimed by the government. On the other hand, this has resulted in massive neglect of other tribes, like in sections of the historically pro-Moroccan Tekna confederation, where pro-Polisario sentiment has grown correspondingly.

As for the near-double turnout in Dakhla … well, I don’t think that is really anything to be surprised about. First, it’s highly urbanized and tribal. Second, the same mix of suspicion, repression and state mobilization that ensured high levels of participation in Morocco-proper in the bad old days, are still in effect in Western Sahara … so high results follow, with or without outright rigging.

Also, about 60-80% of the present W. Sahara population are post-75 immigrants from Morocco — Polisario say “settlers” — so one should not jump to conclusions about what the figure represents, even if the political situation had been standard.

Sadly, I heard that the NDI observer mission didn’t send a single election observer to the Saharan provinces, so I fear there won’t be any international scrutiny of these numbers.

source: http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2007/09/07/morocco-election-photoblog-lets-users-talk-politics-with-pictures/

this sentence i found describes exactly the feeling i got during the past couple of weeks that I spent in Morocco. I tried to pay close attention to the messages the parties were sending out, but as you said the message was one: more jobs, no corruption, the sky is blue…