Source: The Middle East Journal, Summer 2002 v56 i3 p415(18).

Title: Post-Islamist rumblings in Egypt: the emergence of the Wasat party. Author: Joshua A. Stacher

Subjects: Egypt - Politics and government Political parties - Egypt Islamic fundamentalism - Political aspects Islam and politics - Egypt Women in politics - Egypt Elections - Planning Locations: Egypt Organizations: Moslem Brotherhood - Political activity

Electronic Collection: A91201991 RN: A91201991

Full Text COPYRIGHT 2002 The Middle East Institute

This article examines the emergence of the Wasat party initiative in Egypt. Whether such a group constitutes a political development in Islamic groupings in comparison to the traditional paradigm is the main focus. The Wasat is analyzed within a post-Islamist framework. The influences on the initiative, the reason for its establishment, and its apparent inclusive ideology will help to determine if a post-Islamist project may be emerging. If post-Islamist rumblings are underway in Egypt, we may expect to see eventually the development of an “Islamic democracy.”

At the turn of each new century there will arise in my nation a man who will call for religious revival.–The Prophet Muhammad (1)

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The Muslim Brotherhood as a symbol of discontent in Egypt’s pre and post-revolutionary eras indicates that the organization possesses political durability. However, over time new groups have emerged from within it and developed into autonomous, sometimes violent groups, such as al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad. (2) Yet, regardless of the emergence of splinter groups, the Brotherhood has remained a dynamic socio-political force. In fact, analysts generally agree that the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderation remains its strength. As Sana Abed-Kotob argues, “The Muslim Brotherhood stands out as a politically centrist and moderate group, representing mainstream political Islam.” (3)

In recent years, however, a development has emerged on the Egyptian political scene in the shape of former Muslim Brothers who are willing to challenge the group’s doctrine of moderate political Islam. These former Brotherhood members attempted to establish a political party, which is called Hizb al-Wasat (the Center Party). Since its founding in 1996, the Wasat has twice applied for legal party status with the Political Parties Committee (PPC) and was rejected on both occasions.

The fact that a group of former Muslim Brothers left the Brotherhood to form their own organization based on a platform of moderate political Islam can be regarded as a rare phenomenon, but it was the nature of their ideology that attracts attention. The Wasat argues in favor of democratic reforms, human rights, women’s rights, and the inclusion of Christians in its party project. Consequently, the group is establishing a new paradigm of analysis and discourse in social research fields.

In this article, I examine the reasons behind the emergence and trajectory of the Wasat. The argument presented is that the Wasat is a development of a more inclusive political Islamist entity. Apart from the hard-to-measure influence of the Wasatiyya (Centrist) writers, three possible stimuli will be evaluated. The politicizing experience of Egyptian professional syndicates will be discussed first. Secondly, the establishment of the Wasat party project will be linked to the exclusive internal nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thirdly, it would seem that the harsh nature of the government’s 1995 security operation against the Muslim Brotherhood prior to legislative elections led to the moderation of some of the younger Brothers. It is the Wasat’s expression of discontent with the Brotherhood and governmental repression that a more inclusive project emerged through attempting to establish an Islamist national political party.

THEORETICAL CONCERNS

The post-Islamism conceptualization is useful in understanding the Wasat initiative. Post-Islamism is most clearly defined by Gilles Kepel. In his view, radical Islam is giving way to moderate expression that resembles a Western-Islamic political hybrid. In Kepel’s words: Islamist movements and parties at the turn of the 21st century are striving to reinvent themselves as democratic movements, to denounce the repression they feel they have been victim to. They now invoke the universal rights of man instead of critiquing them with their own substitute version, and they support the previously decried values of the impious West, like freedom of expression and women’s liberties. (4)

This transformation points toward political pragmatism. The substitution of the da’wa (the “call”, preaching) in favor of a more pragmatic approach could lead to a more inclusive project. Thus, given the fact that both radical and moderate Islamisms have failed to change the political arrangement in most Arab countries, Islamism will have to moderate further toward notions of conceptual Western democracy. (5)

It is toward this post-Islamist framework that the Wasat’s proposed party is directed. This is not to say the ideas are necessarily novel. They are a continuation of other Islamist thinkers, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad `Abduh (1849-1905), and Hasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949). (6) However, one fresh aspect is the attempt to organize politically, devise a written platform, and apply for legal party status.

THE EMERGENCE OF EGYPT’S WASAT

Prior to Wasat’s attempt at establishing an Islamist-centered political party, the atmosphere of Egypt’s political Islamism was in transition. In the late 1980s, an Islamist centrist (Wasatiyya) movement began to form among journalists, professionals, and the younger generation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a response to a period of relative tolerance in President Husni Mubarak’s Egypt. Political Islamism had been traditionally seen as represented in the form of a few minor radical groups and the more moderate Brotherhood. (7)

The 1980s witnessed the informal coalescing of several Islamic writers, thinkers, and personalities. This grouping has been called by some academics, such as Raymond Baker, the Wasatiyya (Centrist) stream of thought. The Wasatiyya intellectuals are not politically organized and do not belong to any Islamist group, (8) but they proved to be the main source of influence and ideas for the Wasat party when it emerged in 1996. These intellectuals continue to develop a school of thought that is outwardly expanding the boundaries of moderate Islamism. According to Baker, the centrists are a distinct break from this typical paradigm of political Islam in Egypt. He argues that centrists are “thinking on such critical issues as the joint role of Christians and Muslims in the Islamic civilizational project and the need to democratize the political order.” (9) Baker views Egypt’s Wasatiyya as extremely fluid and spontaneously coalescing in a positive reforming manner. Thus, as a result, “The New Islamic Trend … are a remarkable and diverse group of prominent intellectuals who have emerged as the most critical intellectual force in defining the Islamic Wasatiyyah.” (10)

The members of this informal Wasatiyya group are difficult to classify or frame. The group includes such thinkers as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Muhammad `Imara, and Muhammad Salim al-`Awwa. (11) The members of the Wasatiyya group seem to differ on historical references toward Islam, ideas on Shari`a, and perceptions of modernity. However, they are interconnected though their views on nationalism, minority rights, women’s rights, and democracy. In the words of one Wasat founder, “human knowledge of Islam, the relationship to the state, cooperation with the state, the call for democracy and acceptance of human rights were all incorporated from the ideas of the Wasatiyya thinkers. They are the foundation of the Wasat initiative.” (12)

Egypt’s Wasatiyya group argues democracy is necessary to construct a contemporary society. The centrists feel that this includes rallying around a “system of government … [that has] respect for all freedoms, collective and individual, pluralist elections,” (13) within the framework of rule of law. Also, it appears that the centrists’ scheme of democracy aims at establishing citizenship for all, peaceful means of transition, and recognition of the necessity of compromise as its foundations. This inclusive approach would theoretically enhance the role of religious minorities, women, and other less privileged sectors in society. In this respect, the centrists’ vision appears to be based on merit, rather than an individual’s religious background.

DISCONTENTED EXCLUSION

The emergence of the proposed Wasat project and the disputes within the Brotherhood that led to the formation of the Wasat initiative can be traced back to the syndicate activities of the 1990s. Through the Brotherhood’s eventual control of the most important professional syndicates in Egypt, (14) the jil al-saba`inat (the 1970s generation) appeared to gain valuable political experience as well as the desire to participate formally in politics. In the words of one observer, “the syndicates proved ideal outlets for such frustrations, and the new Islamists seized the opportunity to cultivate this lost generation whose dreams of upward mobility had fizzled.” (15) Led by such “Young Princes” of the Muslim Brotherhood as `Assam Sultan, Abu `Ala’ Madi, `Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Futuh, `Assam al-`Aryan, and Salah `Abd al-Karim, a change began to occur inside the Muslim Brotherhood. In the words of `Abd al-Karim with regard to the syndicates, “Even members who weren’t necessarily sympathetic to the Islamic cause supported us. We never identified ourselves as Muslim Brothers. We held all of our meetings in public in the syndicate headquarters, as opposed to the Muslim Brother veterans who were accustomed to conducting business underground.” (16)

The syndicates allowed the would-be Wasat members the opportunity to gain an independent political base from the Brotherhood while allowing them to develop into Islamist politicians, as opposed to activists. As one Wasat member claimed, “The Brotherhood taught us the government was corrupt and needed to be brought down, but we found through our experience that decisions were taken by a small group of people in the Brotherhood … it was something that made us very uneasy with the Muslim Brotherhood.” (17) This indicates that the younger activists had begun to question whether the Muslim Brotherhood’s structure was drastically different from the government it opposed. In addition, by expanding networks beyond the Brotherhood’s membership with other professionals and by representing the organizational backbone of the Brotherhood, an ensuing conflict was inevitable. The result appears to have been a split between the old guard and the young princes in the Brotherhood. This seems to have been a contributing factor to the emergence of the more liberal political Islamist experiment, Wasat. Indeed, the young princes gained political experience in, and have admitted that their politicization resulted from, the syndicate experience. In the words of Abu `Ala Madi, “We were running the syndicates like political parties. This was never our intention. It just turned out this way.” (18) Hence, because of the increased confidence in their abilities, it is understandable that the Brotherhood’s exclusionary internal dynamics emerged as a source of discontent for the Wasat members.

The syndicate experience and the fact that the leaders of the proposed party were excluded from the decision-making board of the Brotherhood led to the discontent that was expressed in the Wasat initiative. While influential Brotherhood member `Assam al-`Aryan admitted that the Wasat members were excluded from the Brotherhood’s decision-making apparatus, he indicated that the dissenters’ problems stemmed from their personal impatience with the old guard. In the words of al-`Aryan, “The decision making process is institutionalized in the Brotherhood. It takes time to consult (Shura) and some of our former colleagues were urged to bypass this process and take steps to form a party early.” (19) The notion that exclusion was a source of discontent was confirmed by another Wasat founder, `Assam Sultan. Perhaps to justify why some of his contemporaries chose to stay with the Brotherhood, Sultan stressed that while many of the 1970s generation were “ideologically with us,” they were reluctant to join the Wasat because “there were practical and administrative considerations that made them stay within the Brotherhood.” (20) This seems to suggest that younger members who had been incorporated into the Brotherhood’s hierarchy declined to resign despite their sympathies with the Wasat initiative.

In addition to being excluded from the Brotherhood’s decision-making apparatus, it would seem that the notion of applying formally to become a political party contributed to the Wasat’s establishment. Despite the Brotherhood officials’ crediting the group’s founder with the idea of establishing a political party, (21) it would seem this concept is relatively recent in the group’s trajectory. There have been rumors of the Brotherhood establishing a party since the early 1980s. Indeed, `Umar al-Tilmisani, the group’s third Supreme Guide, announced on three separate occasions that a party platform was being prepared before his death in 1986. (22) Despite these claims, however, no attempt to apply for a party license was ever taken through formal channels. In late 1995, there appears to have been an ongoing disagreement on the necessity of a political party within the Brotherhood’s ranks. This, one can assume, manifested itself in the Wasat. Al-`Aryan highlights this point in his assessment of the Wasat affair: Basically, it comes down to who has the right to decide to make a political party–to make the steps to go to the PPC. Who has the power to enlist the 50 or 60 people, who are members of the Brotherhood to make a party. This is difficult. And the other item is the relationship with the government. If their step is some sort of harassment against the government or if the government thinks that it should take intense action against the Brotherhood if they want to try and make a party. So how to consider the reaction of the government. These are the two big items that governed this split. (23)

From al-`Aryan’s analysis, it seems clear that the Muslim Brotherhood had undergone an internal discourse regarding the prospects of a formal party, yet the inflexible nature of the organization appears to have remained an obstacle in choosing candidates to lead the project. By concentrating power in the hands of approximately ten senior decision-makers, the Brotherhood alienated other prominent and politicized members, such as Wasat founders Abu `Ala’ Madi, `Abd al-Karim, and Sultan.

Additionally, al-`Aryan points to the Brotherhood’s concern over the government’s response to their application. From this claim, it is possible to suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood leadership preferred to remain wed to the status quo of its illegal-but-tolerated status rather than attract the government’s attention. Perhaps the Brotherhood feared further governmental repression in the form of more police roundups and incarcerations as a result of military tribunals’ verdicts, such as happened prior to the 1995 elections. Indeed, the regime’s 1995 security crackdown on the Brotherhood, resulting in 54 of its prominent members spending three-to-five years in prison, seems to have made the leaders feel threatened. As Campagna notes, the 1995 military court verdict “marked the culmination of a turbulent four-year period that witnessed a deterioration of the state’s tolerance for the outlawed Brotherhood.” (24) The continued imprisonment of the Brotherhood’s best and brightest members may have been perceived as a threat to the group’s visible existence on Egypt’s political landscape.

Whether the regime’s periodic security operations against the Brotherhood actually threatened the group’s political existence in Egypt is debatable, but it can be suggested that the government did attempt to fragment and divide the Brotherhood’s ranks. Another regime crackdown occurred prior to the 2000 legislative elections. This resulted in 15 prominent Brothers being sentenced to three years with hard labor. (25)

One can assume that this policy of governmental repression took a toll on the Brotherhood’s cohesion, because such attacks disrupted and fragmented the group’s internal structure. A logically possible outcome of this repression would be a growth of interest in a more moderate entity that might avoid the government’s wrath. The government, presumably not wanting to target the Brotherhood’s senior leaders so as not to make resistance symbols out of them, instead pursued the group’s more moderate core. This also happened to be composed of the core members who were contemplating the establishment of the Wasat party project. As Al-Wafd reports on the 1995 Brotherhood arrests, “This is within the framework of the first movement in the bone-crushing symphony, be it by attacking the middle cadre of the group and its most moderate, political and efficient elements.” (26) As a result of institutional repression, discontent with the Brotherhood’s internal practices and the politicizing experience of some of the younger generation in syndicates, the conditions were set for the emergence of the Wasat’s moderate Islamist initiative.

Indicative of this, `Abd al-Karim stated “the crisis manifested itself over a period of about ten years … We always felt we had something to give to society and the state, but the [Brotherhood] leadership always denied us. So we decided to give the Wasat a trial run.” (27) After nearly a decade of internal change through the influence of the Wasatiyya’s public discourse, the syndicates’ politicizing experiences, mounting frustration with the Brotherhood’s autocratic rigidity, and fear from government repression, discontentment produced some members’ resignations. The stated intention of establishing the Wasat party resulted in a public row between the Wasat and the Muslim Brotherhood. In the words of Habib, “Abu `Ala’ thought the older members of the Brotherhood were reluctant to allow a political party to be established and his main concern was rooted in the notion that if they waited the timing would not be suitable. It would be too late and the chance to establish a party would pass.” (28) This seems to demonstrate a shift in the approach of the would-be Wasat founders.

In this instance the Wasat members’ desire to participate formally in politics overrode support of the da`wa of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this sense, they pragmatically chose to become Islamist politicians, rather than restrict their roles to that of activists in the Brotherhood. The results to date for the Wasat have not been greeted amicably by the Egyptian government’s Political Parties Committee (PPC).

RESOLVING DISCONTENT?: THE WASAT INITIATIVE AND ITS ATTEMPTS AT LEGALITY

Perhaps not surprisingly, the dispute within the Brotherhood escalated and came to a head in January 1996 when a group of Muslim Brothers resigned from the organization and applied for legal party status under the proposed title, the Wasat. The founding members consisted of 74 individuals, 62 of whom were former Muslim Brothers.

In view of the considerable amount of former Brothers in the proposed party, governmental caution toward this new party applicant was not unexpected. Arguably unsure if this presented the Egyptian government with a chance to damage the Brotherhood, or alternatively, the opportunity to make a mistake that would legalize a potential disguised Brotherhood party, the PPC chose a cautious approach. The PPC made it clear that former Brotherhood members would not be granted a party of their own. As a consequence, a wave of mass defections from the Wasat back to the Brotherhood occurred. Thus, nearly all of the Wasat’s ex-Brothers formally rejoined the Brotherhood. (29) As a result, the PPC dismissed the Wasat petition, because it no longer had the legally-required minimum of 50 founding members in accordance with Sadat’s notoriously abused political parties Law 40/1977.

Moreover, because nearly 60 of the Wasat’s founding members returned to the Brotherhood fold, the government most probably felt that it had correctly assumed that the Wasat project was a Brotherhood initiative to gain legal party status. After nearly two years of restructuring internally and appeals in court, the Wasat was finally rejected by the PPC on May 9, 1998. This time, the reason given by the PPC was that the Wasat “failed to add anything new to the existing political parties,” which is a stipulation in Law 40/1977. Dissuaded by the decision, less than 48 hours later, Abu Ala’ Madi submitted a new proposed party platform called al-Wasat al-Misri (The Egyptian Middle) for the PPC’s consideration. The proposed party platform in this case more closely resembled the Wasatiyya movement that arose in the 1980s. This proposed party comprised 93 founding members, which included only 24 Brotherhood members who had formally resigned from that organization, three Christians (two Copts and one prominent Protestant thinker, Rafiq Habib) and 19 female members. Regarding membership, a distinct progression had occurred between the two years that lapsed between the Wasat’s establishment and the application of al-Wasat al-Misri.

To a large degree, this last attempt by Wasat to gain recognition as a political party can be seen as the formal split between the group and the Brotherhood. Indicative of this Abu `Ala’ Madi claimed in a 1998 interview, “This time the former Brotherhood elements make up 24 out of a total of 93, only about 25 percent, of our membership. There are independent Islamist personalities, who never associated with the Brotherhood, within the substance of the new idea.” (30) Even though the Wasat overhauled its platform, the basic tenets–commitment to democracy, peaceful reform, and the notion that any citizen is entitled to hold any position of power in the country–remained unchanged.

Nevertheless, on September 21, 1998, the PPC again rejected the Wasat’s efforts to gain legal recognition, on grounds that “it failed to add anything new to the existing political parties” in Egypt. The proposed party’s appeal to the September ruling was subsequently rejected on June 5, 1999, thus formally ending the group’s legal attempts for the establishment of a political party While Madi maintains they will continue their efforts to be licensed at a future date, (31) no such proposals have been made. To date, while the Wasat party may have been prevented from formal political participation in Egypt at present, the Islamist centrist movement appears willing to change in order to achieve its political objectives.

One development that should be noted, however, is the Ministry of Social Affairs’ acceptance of an NGO called Misr: Li’l-Thiqafa wa Hiwar (Egypt: For Culture and Dialogue) in April 2000. This NGO is largely comprised of Wasat members as well as other Wasatiya intellectuals, such as Muhammad Salim al-`Awwa, and secularists, such as Wahid `Abd al-Magid, who both sit on the NGO’s board of directors. The NGO allows for lines of communication to remain open between different trends, while simultaneously allowing for the Wasat members to continue their dialogue on their Islamist political project. In the words of `Abd al-Magid, “This is a temporary step for the Wasat initiative. It gives them support for an Islamic trend that is ready to cooperate with other people.” (32) By holding workshops, seminars and meetings, the NGO permits the Wasat to continue developing its ideas as well as its flexible ideology by incorporating an increasing number of intellectuals who were not formally connected to the party.

It therefore seems necessary to examine some of the Wasat’s key ideas. While the group’s ideas can be seen as progressive, it must be noted that those ideas remain dynamic and open to change. Indicative of this, the 1998 proposed party platform appears to have greatly developed as compared to the first attempt in 1996. Over time, the views have tended to become more moderate and pragmatic, which may give them wider appeal and political viability. The reason for this gradual moderation stems from the fact the group continues to work to develop its ideology and identity through its interactions with the media, secular figures, its NGO, and the Wasatiyya group.

DEVELOPMENT OF A PLATFORM

The Wasat’s second political platform was submitted to the PPC on May 11, 1998. Salah `Abd al-Karim, a former Muslim Brother and Professor of Aeronautical Engineering at Cairo University, was the author of the platform. He framed the Wasat initiative as a national project with Islamic civilization as its backdrop. Essentially, the experiment’s aim is to help Egypt reach a level of increased development and regain its cultural heritage and faith. This can only be done through an understanding of the Islamic Arab civilization and the common basis that Muslims and Christians share “the values of unity, justice, respect for rights, and hatred of tyranny.” (33) While this seems general, it attempts to lay the basis of understanding that Muslim and Christians can use to construct a national project. It is also important to note that the Wasat stipulates submission to the state and its constitution in order to realize its project. (34)

DEMOCRACY

Democracy is an important element of the Wasat Party project. Unlike the other moderate political Islamist groups, Wasat spokesmen describe the meaning of democracy in their political text. While claiming “our nation does not know minorities in the Western sense of the word,” it sees the source of sovereign authority as resting in the hands of the people. (35) The state is portrayed as a body that implements the will of the people as determined by a constitution. To attempt to represent accurately the will of the people, a democratically elected council, independent of the state, should be in charge of guarding the constitution from abuses. In this vein, the constitution serves as the line of demarcation for the state. Thus, the Wasat’s democratic vision views separation of powers as a key element contributing to inclusive governance.

Elections constitute a major part of the Wasat notion of democracy. As its platform states, “One of the most important requirements for the nation to be the source of authority is stressing the matter of peaceful exchange of power. This means that it is the nation that determines and chooses its delegates without force, or being under physical or moral duress.” (36) This, contrast, differs from the current state of elections and the regime’s use of coercion to secure votes and parliamentary majorities. (37) Furthermore, Wasat founder Abu `Ala’ Madi argues that fair elections will encourage more governmental effectiveness. As he stated in an interview, “we have the people deciding through elections to help in making laws fit a formula between the Islamic principles of Shari`a and modernity. We will use these boundaries to create the laws. In turn, it will make parliament more efficient and representative because tolerance and flexibility is the highest value when the laws are being made.” (38)

In view of this, the Wasat cites the need for ruling and opposition parties to share in the duties and obligations of government, which not only includes creation of legislation, but also tasks such as coalition building and compromising on issues for the good of the country. (39) As can be detected from the Wasat’s platform, inclusive democratic rule seems to be the paramount goal. Key concepts such as tolerance, compromise, elections, and peaceful transfers of power are all noticeably present in its articulation. Indeed, it can be argued that the use of terms like coalition building and parliaments appear to refer implicitly to some of the democracies of the European Union (EU). However, and equally important, Madi suggests that Shari`a law will be consulted when creating new legislation. This indicates that a Wasatiya influence from Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s notion of an Islamic democracy is present in the Wasat’s platform. (40)

SHARI`A

It is within this context that Wasat’s platform attempts to blend the notions of Islamism and Shari`a with Western institutions, such as parliaments. This appears to conform to the prevailing government’s theoretical style of rule, while resembling a post-Islamist model. While one can argue that these are also tools of the Muslim Brotherhood, it can likewise be argued that the Wasat differs by offering a clear written vision. In view of the group’s commitment to democracy, the question of implementing Shari`a remains problematic in the Wasat’s platform.

This is not surprising, for the implementation of Shari`a has always been a point of contention regarding Islamist organizations. Clearly, a rigidly interpreted Shari`a can serve as an exclusionary tool–not least for the restrictions it can impose on non-Muslims and women. (41) Of course, Shari`a has also been used as a political weapon, as reflected in the Taliban’s Afghanistan or the puritanical Wahhabi interpretations that prevail in Saudi Arabia. Such conservative applications of Shari`a represent political Islam’s norm as all-too-often portrayed in the media. Indicative of this, some observers, such as Daniel Pipes, see Shari`a as directly opposing notions of liberalism, justice, and modernity. As he argues, “the sacred law contains a vast body of regulations touching on every aspect of life, many of them contrary to modern practice. It calls for cutting off the hands of thieves, which runs contrary to all modern sensibilities, as do its mandatory covering of women and the separation of the sexes.” (42) Despite the more conservative implementations of Shari`a, negative portrayals in the media should not overlook Shari`a potential of being applied in a more inclusive system of government.

The Wasat views the implementation of Shari`a largely within parameters enunciated by Wasatiyya writer Tariq al-Bishri. Thus, Abu `Ala’ Madi refutes the exclusionary nature of the Shari`a. As he argues: We have commitments that need to accommodate the principles of modernity. We must have ijtihad (independent interpretation) so to benefit the greatest number of people. This will require people from all trends to create laws that can fit this formula. This, in turn, would make parliament more efficient and flexible. (43)

Yet in the Wasat’s proposed party, Shari`a continues to be a factor from which the Islamist orientation of the group has not deviated in favor of secular based law.

The Wasat insists that it approves of Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution, which stipulates that Shari`a should remain “the principal” source of legal inspiration. (44) The group refers to Shari`a by claiming it is its duty “to adhere to the implementation of the second article of the constitution.” (45) Furthermore, Madi feels that if Shari`a is correctly implemented it could ease the transition to modernity. In his words, “Shari`a is very simply a collection of guiding principles, which should be put to ijtihad, to a free interpretation in order to adapt them to a world in the process of change.” (46)

In this vein, the Wasat can be regarded as progressive when compared to the traditional moderate Islamist groups who maintain Shari`a should be the sole and “unique source” of legislation. (47) Members of the Wasat believe Shari`a can be viewed as a tool to facilitate modernity if interpreted properly by democratically elected religious officials. Some, such as Wahid `Abd al-Magid, feel that the Wasat approach the subject of Shari’a with political maturity. Rather than viewing the potential negative uses of Shari’a, however, he welcomes the Wasat initiative’s patience and ability to remain flexible in this area. As `Abd al-Magid argues, “I do not think they have a final position. It needs a long time to reach a kind of understanding of what will be the Shari’a model that is suitable for this time.” (48) While the subject of Shari’a can be further debated, one can see the Wasat’s approach as relatively liberal, given the traditional nature of some of the political Islamist groups that exist in the contemporary Middle East.

GROUP MEMBERSHIP: NON-MUSLIMS

The issue of Shari’a is important because it would potentially affect Egypt’s Christians, who are at least 10% of the population. In this sense, it can be suggested that the Wasat view Shari’a law through al-Bishri’s notions of its application. Al-Bishri holds that Shari’a needs to be implemented for the Muslims in the nation. However, he also advocates that Christians should enjoy equal citizenship and that it is the responsibility of Muslim jurists to create a system of law that applies to non-Muslims. Thereby all citizens, regardless of religious affiliation, would be afforded and guaranteed equal rights before the law.

This notion of trying to ensure that Christians attain equal treatment with Muslims in terms of rights and duties, can also be found in the Wasat’s program. It claims that Egypt’s Muslims and Christians have contributed to The values of the same civilizational and social systems under which they both lived after jointly establishing them. Hence in this Islamic civilizational project, Muslims and Christians are considered equal partners since they are the sons of one nation and one civilization, in spite of religious difference. (49)

While this can be compared to similar statements made by the Muslim Brotherhood, it is possible the Wasat represents a more inclusive experiment.

The reason for why Wasat appears to be more inclusive is found in the nature of membership in the two organizations. While the Wasat’s proposed party maintains three Christians in its ranks, it can also boast of having a Christian on its five-man board of operations. Rafiq Habib, the prominent Egyptian Protestant intellectual, has been a member of the Wasat since its 1996 founding and remains a vocal member. Habib says the difference resides in the fact that it is a national project. In his words, “we are trying to say that our Islamic culture, we are not speaking about religion, is what brings us together. It is a very modern notion.” (50) Despite being linked to political Islamism, the Wasat membership is open to anyone because it is a civil-political group. Any citizen willing to accept the group’s platform, with its derived “Islam as civilization” concept, is welcome to join. (51) Indicative of this, in the Wasat Party’s attempt in 1998 it is worth noting that 19 women and three Christians were included out of a total of 93 founders. (52) Madi, moreover, claims that these numbers are increasing. Currently, the Wasat claims that it has approximately thirty women and ten to twelve Christians in its membership ranks. (53)

These inclusive conditions for membership do not apply in the Muslim Brotherhood. As a former Muslim Brother, Madi claims, “Membership in the Muslim Brotherhood is dependent on your religion–everyone should be Muslim, not only Muslim but a special kind of Muslim. Not all Muslims can be members of the Muslim Brotherhood.” (54) Some analysts, such as Nabil `Abd al-Fattah, credit this to the traditional, static approach of the Brotherhood. In his words: The Muslim Brotherhood maintains concepts like dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb. The simplicity about the West and the Muslim world, which carries with it an `us/them’ duality. This is a very simple and very conservative way of thinking about the world. The Muslim Brotherhood until now refuses to recognize the citizenship of `others,’ the Christians in their society. While they have made steps regarding Christians and women, they have never presented a clear political declaration. (55)

These conditions of group membership make the Wasat initiative quite avant-garde in comparison. Indeed, if Islamism has begun to transform into post-Islamism then it seems appropriate to suggest that the Wasat is more equipped to deal with the demands of contemporary political governance and democratic development. As `Abd al-Fattah argues, “The Muslim Brotherhood needs a better understanding about the sophistication of the world and of Egyptian culture if it is to be able to advance the group into the modern world.” (56)

GROUP MEMBERSHIP: WOMEN

The Wasat’s inclusive membership also extends to women. This alone identifies its ideology as more moderate than that of the Muslim Brotherhood. (57) Indeed, if Wasat leader Madi is accurate in estimating that of 200 members 30 are women, women comprise 15 percent of the Wasat’s membership. While this percentage may appear impressive, it is on the issue of women that the Wasat seems to be the least liberal.

According to the proposed platform, it is not difficult to deduce that while women are granted equal civil and political rights, they are still essentially viewed in traditional terms. For example, the platform discusses the differences between the West and Islamic worlds. The West is portrayed as the culture of the individual, in contrast to Islamic societies where the family remains the most basic unit. Thus, the Wasat sees Western individualism as permitting “the youth to fall prey to addiction, and destructive elements such as AIDS.” This, in turn, it is claimed, “represents the ugly face of Western culture.” (58)

The platform identifies the role of women in society as primarily concentrated on the establishment of a family. While the Wasat argues that equality is paramount and that there is no reason to have competition between men and women, it claims the primary role of women is in the home. As the platform argues, “the party stresses that women’s position in society should be viewed through the family, caring for the family is the first main task. No other person can take her place in accomplishing this task.” (59) This type of mentality does not seem to differ from the more traditional views of Islamists, which leads some observers to challenge the potential for change of moderate Islamism. (60) Furthermore, this type of attitude is perpetuated by leading members in the Wasat. In the words of one Wasat founder, “After the prophet died, women started to be pushed back. A lot of Muslim men have done many wrong things to affect Muslim women. Inch by inch it has progressed in this fashion. This needs to be changed. So basically we think that women need to be included. They are part and parcel of life.” (61) Despite this statement that women are included, it appears that the reality is different in the party project.

This treatment has affected the type of women that are being drawn into the Wasat’s ranks. There is little known about the female members. Moreover, none of the Wasat women members sit on the group’s five-man board of directors nor can it be argued that they have a significant role in the party. Nabil `Abd al-Fattah, a researcher of political Islamist trends in Egypt, does not know any of the women either personally or through their activities and suggests that the Wasat needs to develop further its position on women. In his words: There may be 30 women in the group but I do not think they are very active. They participate in the NGO’s sessions, but are noticeably absent in the organizational procedures of the Wasat. I think the role of women still is not clear. Perhaps, this is just an observation, but I do not see their input as dramatic or significant. (62)

Interestingly, despite these apparent inequalities, the Wasat has promoted some liberal ideas regarding women. As the program states, “It is the right, even duty, of the woman to be a constituent, a candidate, or a member of representing councils, and to occupy all public and professional posts. She is also obliged to take an interest in and participate in all aspects and forms of public work.” (63) This statement implies that while women should take care of the families, their election to any post in the country is theoretically and legally possible. Indicative of this, Madi argues “women have the right to occupy all positions. We said all positions. She has to participate in work in addition to her role in bringing up the children and taking care of the family.” (64) This statement suggests that a woman could not be barred from reaching the political heights of being President of the Republic–an office which is constitutionally blocked to women in contemporary Egypt.

It is within this line of argument that it is theoretically conceivable that a Coptic woman could become Egypt’s President. While it can be suggested that the likelihood of this scenario actually occurring is not realistic at present, it still can be regarded as novel. The fact that a moderate Islamist group has raised such a prospect in its manifesto indicates a shift to a more liberal model. Also, the Wasat’s views on women are not new in themselves and have been stated previously by Wasatiya members. However, in terms of a political Islamist group adopting such a view, this can be regarded as a departure.

POST-ISLAMIST RUMBLINGS?

It can be suggested that as a result of the Wasat’s non-party status, the movement has little choice but to adjust its platform and increase its appeal if it is to survive politically. The fact that the movement retains little following and has not been able to forge a strong independent identity makes the Wasat appear to be little more than a moderate splinter group from the Muslim Brotherhood. In this vein, the Wasat’s emergence from within the Brotherhood is not a new phenomenon. After all, the emergence of radical Islamist groups proceeded from similar circumstances. The main difference between the Wasat and the radicals is that instead of veering off toward the right, the Wasat shifts toward a more liberal model. Indeed, the fact that the political space of the radical groups was effectively being closed through the regime’s repression makes it possible to suggest that this encouraged a moderate expression of Islamism. Thus, the Wasat in its present form as an inactive political grouping conducting cultural activities under the umbrella of a government-licensed NGO does indicate that its political influence is limited. The fact that the NGO can be effectively managed by the government if it were to be perceived as a threat, does not give it the independent basis it needs to bring about change. Given the nature of the Wasat’s political dynamics and its lack of following in Egypt, the movement’s survival over the long term is questionable.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the Wasat party initiative is that it shows the changing and dynamic nature of moderate political Islam in Egypt. The professional class, particularly members drawn from engineers, lawyers, and physicians overwhelmingly dominates the Wasat party. This may be a significant factor with regards to the Wasat’s changing ideology. The fact that the Wasat garners a sizable bloc of discontented former Muslim Brothers, who appear to want to participate formally in Egyptian politics, can be seen as a potential force driving the group’s moderate trend towards political pragmatism. It seems to demonstrate that this shift toward a more liberal approach to moderate Islamism was necessary if the Wasat was to stand a chance of inclusion in Egypt’s prevailing political structures.

While it is no secret that the Brotherhood draws a large percentage of its membership from the same class as does the Wasat, (65) one difference separates the members of the two groups. This differences relates to the da’wa and the notion of pragmatism. The members of the Brotherhood appear content to be in an organization that is not within Egypt’s formal political system and is guided by its own separate vision. On the other hand, Wasat’s membership exhibits the same sociological background as that of the Brotherhood, but is more motivated by a pragmatic desire to participate in formal politics. It is, therefore, possible to describe the Wasat members as “Islamists who want to be politicians.” They are more concerned with pragmatism than with the da’wa. Alternatively, Muslim Brothers remain more purely “political Islamists” and rely more on the da’wa. While such a statement must be tempered by the admission that some Muslim Brothers may be more motivated by a desire to obtain the services and associational gains of belonging to the Brotherhood than by the da’wa, it is worth pointing out the distinction.

Because the hierarchical structure and rigid ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood limit its ability to adapt to change, it is possible to argue that the emergence of the Wasat indicates a development in the political Islam of Egypt. Indeed, as Abu `Ala’ Madi points out, “Our group does not want to remain outside of the state at the expense of ideology. We want to participate. We are politicians. The license is what counts; when we get the license people will follow and we will be able to participate in a legal manner for the service of the country.” (66) By stressing pragmatism as a method of participating in legalized politics, Madi exemplifies an important shift, which may indicate that a new type of Islamist is emerging. Although pragmatic Islamist voices have always existed, the Wasat’s formal efforts to become an accepted political actor may be the harbinger of a deeper action-oriented shift in moderate Islamism.

Olivier Roy perhaps rightly concluded in 1994 that “Islamism is not a geostrategic factor: it will neither unify the Muslim world nor change the balance of power in the Middle East.” (67) However, Roy seems to underestimate the power of Islamism to change and be transformed into a new form. As Islamism continues to grow and change some authors, such as Gilles Kepel, have argued that post-Islamism may contribute to giving the 1970s generation avenues of formal political participation. In the words of Kepel, “Today, passing out of the Islamist era, Muslim societies will build a future that gives a nod to the inevitable by opening to the world and introducing democracy.” (68) As Kepel views it, this new Islamic democracy will be an “admixture of culture, religion, and political and economic modernity.” (69) The Wasat’s experience may show that the multi-layered political Islamist movements in Egypt have begun to shift toward a form of this moderate approach.

While levels of religious extremism and violence in Egypt have declined, it is possible that Egyptian political Islam has mutated accordingly. If so, it is possible to suggest that the pragmatic approach of the professional class Islamists may further contribute to a synthesis or hybrid of political Islamist elements with structures of a more Western model.

The Wasat is not a post-Islamist project in the form that it exists at present. That stated, the Wasat may with time and internal development begin to emerge into an entity that could qualify as such a group. Thus, while it is not possible to suggest that a post-Islamist entity has been established, there may be post-Islamist rumblings that are beginning to push for social and political change in Egypt.

(1.) Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 55.

(2.) al-Jama’a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad both emerged in the 1970s as violent groups basing their ideologies off of prominent radical Egyptian Islamist Sayid Qutb’s (1906-1966) writings. Al-Jama’a was largely radicalized under Shaykh `Umar `Abd al-Rahman, while Jihad was responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981.

(3.) Sana Abed-Kotob, “The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt”, International Journal of Middle East Studies No. 27 (1995), p. 322.

(4.) Gilles Kepel, “Islamism Reconsidered,” Harvard International Review, Vol.22, No. 2, p. 24.

(5.) Kepel, “Islamism Reconsidered,” p. 24.

(6.) This group of thinkers, along with Rashid Rida (1865-1935), are associated with the notion of Islamic “nahda” or renaissance, which focused on establishing a culturally-authentic project that would modernize Islamic societies in comparison to their Western counterparts.

(7.) Established in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood, despite numerous changes in its approach, has been viewed as the organization against which all politically inclined Islamic groups have been measured.

(8.) It must be noted that some of the members of the Wasatiyya thinkers had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood but, of course, this is not true of all of them.

(9.) Raymond Baker, “Invidious Comparisons: Realism, Postmodern Globalism, and Centrist Islamic Movements in Egypt,” in John Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Cairo: AUC Press, 1997), p. 125.

(10.) Baker, “Invidious Comparisons,” p. 126.

(11.) Particularly al-Qaradawi’s vision of Islamic democracy, Salim al-`Awwa’s views on civil society, al-Bishri’s regarding a national project, judicial equality, and Shari`a, and `Imara’s in the field of cultural authenticity and human rights are generally viewed as the Wasatiyya’s contributions.

(12.) `Assam Sultan, lawyer and Wasat party founder, interview by author, April 4, 2001, Cairo, tape recording.

(13.) Eric Rouleau, “Egypt’s Islamists Caught in a Bind,” Le Monde Diplomatique (English Ed.), (January 1998), p. 2.

(14.) The young Brothers controlled through democratic elections the Medical (20 of 25 seats on the board), Lawyers (18 of 24), Pharmacists (17 out of 25), and the Engineers (14 of 24 seats) syndicates from 1989-1995.

(15.) Geneive Abdo, No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), p. 83.

(16.) Abdo, No God but God, p. 93.

(17.) Salah `Abd al-Karim, Engineering Professor and Wasat party founder, interview by author, Cairo, April 8, 2001, tape recording.

(18.) Abdo, No God but God, pp. 99.

(19.) `Assam al-`Aryan, Physician and prominent Muslim Brotherhood member, interview by author, March 27, 2001, Cairo, tape recording.

(20.) Sultan, interview.

(21.) Al-`Aryan, interview.

(22.) Nabil `Abd al-Fattah, “Al-Gama`a tibda’ 96 … bi a `lan ta’sis hizb al-Wasat jaded,” [The Group Begins 1996 with the Announcement of the Establishment of the New Wasat Party], Al-Wafd, January 18, 1996.

(23.) Al-`Aryan, interview.

(24.) Joel Campagna, “From Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak years,” Journal of International Affairs, Volume 50, Issue 1 (Summer 1996), p. 278.

(25.) Most notable from this group was Mukhtar al-Nur, one of the Brotherhood’s syndicate managers in the Bar syndicate.

(26.) Nabil `Abd al-Fatah, “Al Gama`at tibda’96.”

(27.) `Abd al-Karim, interview.

(28.) Rafiq Habib, Director of the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS) and Wasat party founder, interview by author, March 29, 2001, Cairo, tape recording.

(29.) “Young Ex-Brothers Have Another Go at Setting Up Political Party,” MidEast Mirror, May 18, 1998.

(30.) “Young Ex-Brothers Have Another Go at Setting up Political Party,” MidEast Mirror, May 18, 1998.

(31.) Abu `Ala’ Madi, engineer and Wasat party founder, interview by author, March 17, 2001, Cairo, tape recording.

(32.) Wahid `Abd al-Magid, political analyst at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, interview by author, March 20, 2001, Cairo, tape recording.

(33.) Salah `Abd al-Karim, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri (Papers of the Egyptian Wasat Party) (Cairo, May 1998), p. 16.

(36.) `Abd al-Karim, Awraq Hizb al. Wasat al-Misri, p. 25.

(37.) Maye Kassem, “2000 Egyptian Elections: New Rules, New Tactics”, Cairo Papers in Social Science (Cairo: Forthcoming 2001). 38. Madi, interview.

(39.) `Abd al-Karim, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri, p. 25.

(40.) As was noted previously, al-Qaradawi has been arguing for the development of an Islamic democracy for over twenty years.

(41.) Nazih Ayubi, “Islam and Democracy” in Adam Potter (ed.), Democratization(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 352-357.

(42.) Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism,” National Interest, Issue 59, (Spring 2000), p. 89.

(43.) Madi, interview.

(44.) The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, September 1971 and the Amendments May 22nd 1980. (Cairo: General Organization for Government Printing Offices, 1981), pp. 11.

(45.) `Abd al- Karim, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri, p. 19.

(46.) Rouleau, “Egypt’s Islamists Caught in a Bind,” p. 5-6.

(47.) Rouleau, “Egypt’s Islamists Caught in a Bind,” pp.5-6.

(48.) `Abd al-Magid, interview.

(49.) `Abd al-Karim, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri, p. 21.

(50.) Habib, interview.

(51.) Madi, interview.

(52.) `Abd-Karim, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri, p. 78-80.

(53.) Madi, interview.

(54.) Madi, interview.

(55.) Nabil `Abd al-Fattah, political analyst al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, interview by author, March 25, 2001, Cairo, tape recording.

(56.) `Abd al-Fattah, interview by author.

(57.) The Muslim Brotherhood does not permit women members into its organization.

(58.) `Abd al-Karim, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri, p. 28.

(59.) `Abd al-Karim, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri, p. 29.

(60.) Ahmed Sayid, “Duktur Rif’at al-Sa’id: `Al-Wasat’ mujarid ta’ir atalqtahu al-jama a wa rabatat saqau bi-khit.” [Dr. Rif `at al-Sa'id: The Wasat Party is only a bird released by the Brotherhood after tying its legs with a string] al-Ahrar January 12, 1998.

(61.) `Abd al-Karim, interview.

(62.) `Abd al-Fattah, interview.

(63.) `Abd al-Karim, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat al-Misri, p. 29.

(64.) Muhammad Harbi, “Abu `Ala’ Madi: Lasna Hizban Ikhwanan Lakin Sha arina `al-Islam Huwa al-Hal’,” [Abu `Ala Madi: We are not a Brotherhood Party but our Slogan is `Islam is the Solution'] Al-Wasat (London), January 22, 1996.

(65.) Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, Princeton UP, 1996), p. 110.

(66.) Madi, interview.

(67.) Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994), p. 194.

(68.) Kepel, “Islamism Reconsidered,” p. 25.

(69.) Kepel, “Islamism Reconsidered,” p. 27.

Joshua A. Stacher was a Sasakawa Fellow in the Department of Political Science at The American University in Cairo. He will begin a Ph.D. program at the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews in September 2002. The author is indebted to his wife Maye Kassem for constantly entertaining, supporting, and helping to develop his ideas. Without her support and editing, this effort would be paralyzed. The author also wishes to thank Dr. Dan Tschirgi for his close supervision and editing on this project.